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THE SEAT BELT DEFENSE: MUST
THE REASONABLE MAN WEAR A
SEAT BELT?
Insurance Co. of America v. Pasakarnis'
The "seat belt defense" has been the subject of extensive litigation in the
past two decades.2 This defense raises the issue of whether the plaintiff may
recover for the full extent of his personal injuries resulting from an automobile
accident where it can be shown by competent evidence that some of his inju-
ries could have been eliminated or minimized had an available seat belt been
worn.4 The law in this area remains unsettled despite the courts' increasing
familiarity with the issue." A majority of the courts considering the defense
have rejected it.6 Many of those decisions were based at least in part on tort
theories which have been abandoned7 and factual assumptions which have
1. 451 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 1984).
2. Derheim v. N. Fiorito Co., 80 Wash. 2d 161, 167, 492 P.2d 1030, 1034
(1972). See generally Kircher, The Seat Belt Defense-State of the Law, 53 MARQ. L.
REV. 172 (1970); Comment, The Seat Belt Defense: Should Coloradoans Buckle Up
for Safety?, 50 U. COLO. L. REv. 375, 376 (1979); Annot., 95 A.L.R.3d 239 (1979);
Annot., 92 A.L.R.3d 9 (1979); Annot., 80 A.L.R.3d 1033 (1977).
3. Seat belt as used herein is the shoulder strap-lap belt combination restraint
device. The installation of this type of seat belt has been required by federal law since
1968. U.S. Dep't of Transp. Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., Effectiveness and
Efficiency of Safety Belt and Child Restraint Usage Programs (1982) [hereinafter
cited as DOT, Effectiveness and Efficiency of Safety Belt Usage]. For federal regula-
tions concerning seat belt installation see 15 U.S.C. § 1410(b) (1982), 49 C.F.R. §
571.208 (1983).
4. E.g., Insurance Co. of North America v. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d 447, 449
(Fla. 1984); Spier v. Barker, 35 N.Y.2d 444, 446, 323 N.E.2d 164, 165, 363 N.Y.S.2d
916, 917 (1974); Note, The Seat Belt Defense: A Comprehensive Guide for the Trial
Lawyer and Suggested Approach for the Courts, 56 NOTRE DAME LAW. 272 (1980);
Comment, A Realistic Look at the Seat Belt Defense, 1983 DET. C.L. REv. 827
(1983).
5. See, e.g., Derheim v. N. Fiorito Co., 80 Wash. 2d 161, 167, 492 P.2d 1030,
1034 (1972) ("courts have been inconsistent in their handling of the defense"); Com-
ment, supra note 3, at 829 ("confusion and inconsistent rulings. . . and a basic uncer-
tainty as to the status of the seat belt defense"); Note, supra note 3, at 272 ("unsettled
issue in automobile litigation").
6. E.g., Reaves, Buckle Up, 70 A.B.A. J. 35 (Nov. 1984); Note, supra note 3,
at 284; Note, Buckling Up for Safety: Should Florida Reconsider the Seat Belt De-
fense?, 13 STETSON L. REV. 160, 162-63 (1983); Comment, supra note 3, at 838.
7. Comment, supra note 3, at 842 ("contributory negligence jurisdictions raise
the issue of unfairness in denying recovery when the plaintiff did not cause the acci-
dent. Comparative negligence jurisdictions are not susceptible to this concern because
1
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been proven erroneous.8 The viability of the seatbelt defense must be reexam-
ined in light of changes in law, science, and technology. This casenote will
examine the recent decision of the Florida Supreme Court in Insurance Co. of
North America v. Pasakarnis,9 and the reasons prompting the court's decision
to allow the seat belt defense.
While driving his jeep, Pasakarnis was involved in an automobile accident
with Defendant/Petitioner Menninger. 0 Menninger's car ran a stop sign and
struck Pasakarnis' jeep broadside. The accident was caused entirely by Men-
ninger's negligence. 1' Pasakarnis was not wearing his seat belt. 2 He was
thrown from his jeep and sustained a compression fracture in his lower back.1 3
Pasakarnis' physician testified that his injury was caused from impacting on
the pavement.
1 4
Menninger alleged as an affirmative defense that Pasakarnis was negli-
gent in not wearing his seat belt in that had he been wearing his seat belt, his
injuries would have been reduced or prevented.' 5 Menninger further alleged
that Pasakarnis' damages should be reduced in proportion to his negligence.' 6
The trial court granted a motion to strike the defense.' 7 The District Court of
Appeal, Fourth District, affirmed. It held the seat belt evidence inadmissible' 8
on the authority of Lafferty v. Allstate Insurance Co. 9
the plaintiffs recovery is not barred by his contributory negligence. . This would
also hold true in jurisdictions that have changed from contributory negligence to com-
parative fault.
8.' Several courts holding seat belt evidence inadmissible commented on the
uncertainty concerning the effectiveness of seat belts. See, e.g., Britton v. Doehring,
286 Ala. 498, 508, 242 So. 2d 666, 675 (1970); D.W. Boutwell Butane Co. v. Smith,
244 So. 2d 11, 12 (Miss. 1971); Miller v. Miller, 273 N.C. 228, 233, 160 S.E.2d 65, 69(1968). But see DOT, Effectiveness and Efficiency of Safety Belt ix (1982) ("there is
unequivocal evidence that safety belts . . . could prevent about half of all such deaths
[from second collision with interior of car]"); U.S. Dep't of Transp., Nat'l Highway
Traffic Safety Admin., Safety Belt Usage Attitude Study [hereinafter cited as DOT,
Safety Belt Usage Attitude Study], § 1.2 (1979) ("occupants not using seat belts were
3 1h times more likely to be killed, 3 times as likely to be seriously injured. . . as those
who were wearing safety belts"). Courts are also beginning to comment on the effec-
tiveness of seat belts. See Spier v. Barker, 35 N.Y.2d 444, 452, 323 N.E.2d 164, 168,
363 N.Y.S.2d 916, 922 (1974) ("there can be no doubt whatsoever as to the efficiency
of the automobile seat belt in preventing injuries").
9. 451 So. 2d 447.
10. Id. 451 So. 2d at 449. It is impossible to tell from the facts given if the top








18. Id. at 450.
19. 425 So. 2d 1147 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (rejecting the seat belt defense
because, inter alia, it was improper for the judiciary to legislate, there is no duty to
1985]
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The Supreme Court of Florida addressed the viability of the seat belt
defense for the first time in Pasakarnis.20 The court noted that a number of
cases21 involving the seat belt defense never reached the merits of that de-
fense 22 because of problems in pleading23 and/or producing evidence.24
The court first addressed whether allowing the seat belt defense is appro-
priate for judicial decision. 25 Noting that tort law is peculiarly nonstatutory,
the court stated it had not hesitated in the past in overturning unsound prece-
dent in the area of tort law. 26 It is the duty of the court to ensure that "the
law remains both fair and realistic as society and technology change."2 The
issue is thus appropriate for judicial decision, since "[tlo abstain from acting
responsibly in the present case on the basis of legislative deference would be to
consciously ignore a limited area where decisions by lower courts have created
an illogical exception to the doctrine of comparative negligence." 28
The court next discussed the purposes and applicability of comparative
negligence. In Hoffman v. Jones,29 the Florida Supreme Court adopted pure
comparative fault stating that it provided a more equitable system of deter-
mining liability than contributory negligence.30 Under a system of pure com-
parative fault, the plaintiff is barred from recovering only that portion of his
damages for which he is responsible. 31 The court stated that a logical and
consistent application of comparative fault required the application of the seat
belt defense. 32
The court continued by stating the failure to wear an available seat belt is
a pertinent factor to consider when deciding if the plaintiff exercised due care
anticipate the negligence of another, and the duty to mitigate damages arises only after
the plaintiff is injured, not before), rev'd, 451 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 1984).
20. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d at 450.
21. The court was referring to cases decided by the district courts of appeal.
See infra notes 23, 24.
22. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d at 450.
23. Id. (citing Chandler Leasing Corp. v. Gibson, 227 So. 2d 889 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1969) (defendant failed to plead contributory negligence and did not seek instruc-
tions on the issue)).
24. Id. at 451 (citing Quinn v. Millard, 358 So. 2d 1378 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1978) (record did not contain sufficient evidence to show that the plaintiff would have
been less seriously injured had he been wearing an available seat belt at the time of the
accident)); see also Brown v. Kendrick, 192 So. 2d 49 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
25. Pakakarnis, 451 So. 2d at 451.
26. Id. at 451. The Florida Supreme Court adopted comparative fault absent a
legislative mandate in Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973). The court has
modified common law in the past as the occasion required. Jurisdiction which have
allowed the seat belt defense have done so without a legislative mandate. See also
Note, supra note 5, at 170.
27. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d at 451.
28. Id.
29. 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
30. Id. at 438.
31. Id.
32. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d at 453.
[Vol. 50
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for his own safety.33 Several factors were listed in support of this decision. The
court stated the effectiveness of seat belts in reducing deaths and decreasing
the severity of injuries suffered in automobile accidents was unequivocal."
Furthermore, automobile accidents and "second collisions" with the interior of
the automobile are foreseeable.35 The seat belt affords the automobile occu-
pant an opportunity to minimize personal injury before an accident occurs.3s
Given these factors, and in light of the minimal effort required to fasten a seat
belt, the failure to wear a seat belt is "obviously pertinent and thus should be
deemed admissible in an action for damages, part of which would not have
been sustained if the seat belt had been used."37
The court discussed three theories under which seat belt evidence may be
admissible.38 The first of these theories states nonuse of an available seat belt
is negligence per se.39 This approach was rejected because Florida does not
statutorily require the use of a seat belt.4 0 The second theory, that one not
utilizing an available seat belt may be found contributorily negligent, was also
33. Id. (quoting Insurance Co. of North American v. Pasakarnis, 425 So. 2d
1141, 1143 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (Schwartz, J., dissenting)).
34. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d at 453 (citing United States Dep't of Transp., Na-
tional Highway Traffic Safety Comm'n, Effectiveness and Efficiency of Safety Belt and
Child Restraint Usage ix (1982)). But see Insurance Co. of North America v.
Pasakarnis, 425 So. 2d 1141 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982), rev'd, 451 So. 2d 447 (Fla.
1984); Lafferty v. Allstate Ins. Co., 425 So. 2d 1147 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982), rev'd,
451 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 1984). Both cases relied heavily upon Brown v. Kendrick, 192 So.
2d 49 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966), in deciding not to allow the seat belt defense. Brown
listed among its main reasons for rejecting the seat belt defense the questionable effec-
tiveness of the seat belt as a safety precaution.
35. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d at 453 (citing Ford Motor Co. v. Evancho, 327 So.
2d 201 (Fla. 1976)). Pasakarnis and Evancho adopted the language of Larsen v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 501-02 (8th Cir. 1968):
Automobiles are made for use on the roads and highways in transporting per-
sons and cargo to and from various points. This intended use cannot be car-
ried out without encountering in varying degrees the statistically proved haz-
ard of injury-producing impacts of various types. . . .While automobiles are
not made for the purpose of colliding with each other, a frequent and inevita-
ble contingency of normal automobile use will result in collisions and injury
producing impacts.
36. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d at 453 (citing Spier v. Barker, 35 N.Y.2d 444, 323
N.E.2d 164, 363 N.Y.S.2d 916 (1974)).
37. Id. (quoting Insurance Co. of North America v. Pasakarnis, 425 So. 2d
1141, 1143 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (Schwartz, J., dissenting), rev'd, 451 So. 2d 447
(Fla. 1984)).
38. Id. These three theories are (1) plaintiff's nonuse as negligence per se, (2)
plaintiff is contributorily negligent for failing to comply with the standard of conduct
which a reasonable prudent man would-have pursued under similar circumstances, and
(3) apportionment of damages theory which states that in not using a seat belt, the
plaintiff may have acted unreasonably and in disregard of his own best interest and
therefore should not be able to recover for those injuries which would not have oc-
curred had his seat belt been fastened.
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rejected."1 The court stated contributory negligence is applicable only if the,
failure to use reasonable care is a cause of the accident and not just a factor
increasing the severity of the injuries.' 2 The third theory states that nonuse of
an available seat.belt may or may not, according to the circumstances, amount
to a failure to use reasonable care.43 In adopting this theory, the court stated
that the defendant had the burden of pleading and proving the plaintiff did not
use an available and operational seat belt, that such nonuse was unreasonable
under the circumstances, and that there was a causal connection between the
nonuse and the injuries sustained." If there is competent evidence' 5 to meet
this burden of proof, the jury should be allowed to consider it in deciding
whether the plaintiff's damage award should be reduced. 46
To aid the jury in apportioning plaintiff's damages, the court gave the
jury special interrogatories.' 7 The jury was to decide the total amount of dam-
ages incurred and the percentage of fault attributable to the plaintiff's failure
to wear a seat belt.'8 The court would then reduce the total damages by the
plaintiff's percentage of fault.4 9
The court found that the trial court erred in not allowing the proffered
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 454.
44. Id.
45. The court did not define competent, but in Pasakarnis the evidence that the
plaintiff would have been less seriously injured had he worn his seat belt was presented
by an expert witness. The defendant's engineer-accident analyst stated had the plaintiff
worn his seat belt, there was a high probability that he would not have been injured at
all.
46. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d at 454.
47. The jury must first determine the total amount of the plaintiff's damages
using the interrogatory in the verdict. Id. The special interrogatory suggested reads as
follows:
(a) Did defendant prove that the plaintiff failed to use reasonable care
under the circumstances by failing to use an available and fully operational
seat belt?
___Yes __ No
If your answer to question (a) is No, you should not proceed further except to
date and sign this verdict form and return it to the courtroom. If your answer
to question (a) is Yes, please answer question (b).
(b) Did defendant prove that plaintiff's failure to use an available and
fully operational seat belt produced or contributed substantially to producing
at least a portion of the plaintiff's damages?
__Yes - No
If your answer to question (b) is No, you should not proceed further except to
date and sign this verdict form and return it to the courtroom. If your answer
to question (b) is Yes, please answer question (c).
(c) What percentage of plaintiff's total damages were caused by his (or
her) failure to use an available and fully operational seat belt? __%
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seat belt evidence to be submitted to the jury.50 The case was remanded to the
trial court to determine to what extent, if any, the plaintiff's $100,000 damage
award should be reduced as a result of his failure to wear a seat belt. 51
Justice Shaw in his dissent opposed the seat belt defense on several
grounds. First, he noted that there is a statutory bar52 against evidence of
nonusage of statutorily mandated child restraint devices in civil cases.53 If vio-
lation of that duty cannot be used to reduce damages, evidence of seat belt
nonuse should also be inadmissible to reduce damages.54
Justice Shaw believed the majority's decision to allow the seat belt de-
fense was "at the very least based upon a debatable public policy determina-
tion." 55 He noted there is no common law or statutory duty to wear a seat belt
nor do most people wear seat belts. 58 Furthermore, the doctrine of avoidable
consequences, applied by the Pasakarnis majority as a pre-injury duty, tradi-
tionally does not arise until the plaintiff has been injured.57 According to Jus-
tice Shaw, the majority decision not only "offends traditional notions of tort
law,"58 but also "smacks of judicial policy making." 5 Public policy determina-
tions such as these should be left up to the legislature.60
Justice Shaw also identified technical problems with the seat belt defense.
Such problems include deciding when the duty to wear a seat belt arises, de-
ciding when the defense is available, and determining the necessary increase in
cost, length, and complexity of trial.61 Justice Shaw believed the seat belt de-
fense would lead to a battle of the experts. 2
Problems in pleading and producing evidence have prompted many courts
to refuse to allow the seat belt defense.63 According to one author, in 33 out of
50. Id. at 455.
51. Id.
52. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 316.613(1), (3) (West Supp. 1985).
53. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d at 455 (Shaw, J., dissenting).
54. Id.







62. Id. Justice Shaw stated that the causal connection between seat belt nonuse
and the plaintiff's injuries must be established by expert testimony. This, he felt, would
in turn require the plaintiff to produce expert testimony to counter the defendant's
evidence.
63. See, e.g., Brown v. Kendrick, 192 So. 2d 49 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966);
Eichorn v. Olson, 32 II1. App. 3d 587, 335 N.E.2d 774 (1975); Kavanagh v. Butorac,
140 Ind. App. 139, 221 N.E.2d 824 (1966); D.W. Boutwell Butane Co. v. Smith, 244
So. 2d 11 (Miss. 1971) (noting absence of causal connection between the plaintiff's
nonuse of a seatbelt and the extent of the plaintiff's injuries); Bartlett v. State, 40
A.D.2d 267, 340 N.Y.S.2d 63 (1973). See generally Annot., 95 A.L.R.3d 239 (1979)
(nonuse of automobile seatbelts as evidence of comparative negligence); Annot., 80
1985]
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49 cases considering the seat belt defense the plaintiff's damage award was not
reduced because of insufficient evidence or a ground tangential to the seat belt
issue.6 4 Some courts indicated a willingness to allow the seat belt defense but
refused to do so because of insufficient evidence to prove that seat belt nonuse
caused or increased the plaintiff's injuries.65 The cases indicate that the propo-
nents of the seat belt defense often fail to introduce the evidence needed to
establish all of its elements. 6 Four prevalent errors allow the courts to decide
a case involving the seat belt defense without considering the merits of the
defense. 7
Many courts that have rejected the seat belt defense list among the rea-
sons for so doing a belief that the legislature is the proper forum for resolution
of this issue.68 Some courts have cited examples of legislative intent purport-
edly indicative of the legislature's intent that seat belt usage not be
mandatory.6 9 These courts have mistakenly confused the seat belt defense with
mandatory seat belt usage laws.7 0
A.L.R.3d 1033 (1977) (nonuse of seatbelt as failure to mitigate damages).
64. Comment, Self-Protective Safety Devices: An Economic Analysis, 40 U.
CHI. L. REv. 421, 436-37 (1973).
65. Comment, supra note 3, at 840-41. See, e.g., Kavanagh v. Butorac, 140 Ind.
App. 139, 221 N.E.2d 824 (1966).
66. Bowman, Practical Defense Problems-The Trial Lawyer's View, 53
MARQ. L. REv. 191, 198 (1970).
67. Kircher, supra note 1, at 173. These are "the pleadings did not raise the
defense; the fact that the plaintiff was not using belts was not established; the evidence
did not establish that the injuries would have been prevented or made less severe by
belt use; or the court was not asked to instruct the jury on the seat belt issue." Id.
68. See, e.g., Petersen v. Klos, 426 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970), amended on other
grounds, 433 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1970); Britton v. Doehring, 286 Ala. 498, 242 So. 2d
666 (1970); Fischer v. Moore, 183 Colo. 392, 517 P.2d 458 (1973); Lipscomb v.
Diamiani, 226 A.2d 914 (Del. 1967); Insurance Co. of North America v. Pasakarnis,
451 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 1984) (Shaw, J., dissenting); Brown v. Kendrick, 192 So. 2d 49
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966); Taplin v. Clark, 6 Kan. App. 2d 66, 626 P.2d 1198 (1981);
Hampton v. State Highway Comm'n, 209 Kan. 565, 498 P.2d 236 (1972);
Romankewiz v. Black, 16 Mich. App. 119, 167 N.W.2d 606 (1969); Miller v. Haynes,
454 S.W.2d 293 (Mo. App., St. L. 1970); Selgado v. Commercial Warehouse Co., 88
N.M. 579, 544 P.2d 719 (1975); Miller v. Miller, 273 N.C. 228, 160 S.E.2d 65 (1968);
Roberts v. Bohn, 26 Ohio App. 2d 50, 269 N.E.2d 53 (1971), rev'd on other grounds,
29 Ohio St. 2d 99, 279 N.E.2d 878 (1972); Amend v. Bell, 89 Wash. 2d 124, 570 P.2d
138 (1977); Derheim v. N. Fiorito Co., 80 Wash. 2d 161, 492 P.2d 1030 (1972). For
further discussion on this point see Hoglund & Parsons, Caveat Viator: The Duty to
Wear Seat Belts Under Comparative Negligence Law, 50 WASH. L. REv. 1, 7, 11
(1974); Note, supra note 3, at 286-87; Note, supra note 5, at 170; Comment, The Seat
Belt Defense: Should Coloradoans Buckle Up for Safety?, 50 U. COLO. L. REv. 375,
384 (1979); Comment, supra note 64, at 434-35.
69. E.g., Taplin v. Clark, 6 Kan. App. 2d 66, 69-70, 626 P.2d 1198, 1201
(1981); Amend v. Bell, 89 Wash. 2d 124, 132, 570 P.2d 138, 143 (1977).
70. See supra note 31; Selgado v. Commercial Warehouse Co., 88 N.M. 579,
582, 544 P.2d 719, 722 (1975) ("[t]he public policy of a state fixing a statutory duty to
fasten a seat belt rests with the legislature"); Miller v. Miller, 273 N.C. 228, 231-32,
160 S.E.2d 65, 71 (1968); Derheim v. N. Fiorito Co., 80 Wash. 2d 161, 171, 492 P.2d
[Vol. 50
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Proponents of the seat belt defense are quick to note that lack of legisla-
tion on the issue is not conclusive of legislative intent.71 Indicia of legislative
intent that seat belts be worn are often cited in support of judicial action on
the issue of the seat belt defense.7 2 Proponents of the seat belt defense are not
asking courts to create an absolute duty to wear a seat belt.7 3 Rather, they
claim "that a reasonable man of ordinary prudence would make use of belts in
most instances, but that the matter should be left to the trier of facts to decide
because of the many circumstances involved in highway travel which make a
hard and fast rule unworkable." 74 The defense does not make seat belt usage
mandatory in a statutory sense. Absent a statute there is no criminal liability
for seat belt nonuse. The seat belt defense only demands seat belt usage if the
plaintiff attempts to recover for all of his injuries.
With the coming of age of comparative fault, several jurisdictions have
reexamined the seat belt defense.7 5 In comparative fault jurisdictions, each
party is responsible for that portion of the damages or injuries according to his
fault.7 6 Thus a plaintiff is prevented from recovering for is own injuries to the
extent that he caused them.77
While it has been suggested that comparative fault jurisdictions may re-
act more favorably to the seat belt defense,7 8 the trend in that direction, if
there is one, is slow in developing. Several courts in contributory negligence
1030, 1037 (1972).
71. Note, supra note 5, at 169.
72. E.g., Hoglund & Parsons, supra note 68, at 7; Note, supra note 3, at 283;
Comment, supra note 3, at 846; Comment, supra note 64, at 434. Such indicia of
legislative intent include federal highway safety programs, see, e.g., Hoglund & Par-
sons, supra note 68, at 7 (citing Highway Safety Act of 1973, 23 U.S.C. § 4020)
(Supp. 1974)); Comment, supra note 64, at 434 (citing Highway Safety Act of 1966,
23 U.S.C. § 402 (Supp. 1970)); and state and federal seat belt installation statutes.
See, e.g., Note, supra note 3, at 283; Comment, supra note 3, at 846.
73. Kircher, supra note 1, at 180.
74. Id. at 181.
75. See, e.g., Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d at 447; Clarkson v. Wright, 121 Ill. App.
3d 230, 459 N.E.2d 305 (1984); see also Sullivan, The Seat Belt Defense Should be
Resurrected Under Pure Comparative Negligence, 61 MICH. B.J. 560 (1982). But see
Amend v. Bell, 89 Wash. 2d 124, 570 P.2d 138 (1977).
76. C.R. HEFr & C.J. HEFT, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE MANUAL § 1.10
(1978); see also Comment, supra note 68, at 376. This differs from contributory negli-
gence in that contributory negligence often requires contribution to the accident not
merely the injuries stemming from the accident. See infra notes 133-38 and accompa-
nying text.
77. This statement is totally accurate only under a system of pure comparative
fault. Under a system of modified comparative fault, if the jury found that the unrea-
sonable nonuse of a seat belt caused more than 50% or 51% of his damages, the plain-
tiff would be totally barred from recovery. Currently thirteen states have a pure com-
parative fault system: Alaska, California, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Michigan,
Mississippi, Missouri, New Mexico, New York, Rhode Island, and Washington.
78. Kircher, supra note 1, at 188; C.R. HEFT & C.J. HEFT, COMPARATIVE NEG-
LIGENCE MANUAL § 1.240 (1978) [hereinafter cited as HEFT, COMPARATIVE NEGLI-
GENCE MANUAL]; Annot., 80 A.L.R.3d 1033, 1040 (1977).
19851
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jurisdictions have refused to allow the seat belt defense and decrease the plain-
tiff's damage award by the amount of his contribution to those damages be-
cause to do so would be an implicit adoption of comparative fault, a step they
were unwilling to take. 9 There are also marked distinctions between pure and'
modified comparative fault.80 Thus, it is important to know what kind of tort
fault system a jurisdiction follows.81 The most persuasive arguments in favor
of the seat belt defense82 can be made in pure comparative fault jurisdictions.
In pure comparative fault jurisdictions, the defense is allowed by a slim major-
ity of those courts which have addressed the issue.83 Much of the controversy
79. E.g., Derheim v. N. Fiorito Co., 80 Wash. 2d 161, 171-72, 492 P.2d 1030,
1037 (1972) (en banc). In 1973 Washington statutorily adopted comparative fault. See
Wash. Laws 1973, 1st Ex. Sess. ch. 138 § 1. In 1977 the Supreme Court of Washing-
ton held that the seat belt defense, which was inadmissible under contributory negli-
gence, was also inadmissible under comparative fault. In 1981 the Washington legisla-
ture changed its comparative fault statute and in effect statutorily adopted the Uniform
Comparative Fault Act. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.22.005-.925 (Supp. 1985);
Britton v. Doehring, 286 Ala. 498, 242 So. 2d 666 (1970) (Alabama is still a contribu-
tory negligence state). See generally, Note, supra note 3, at 276; Hoglund & Parsons,
supra, note 68, at 10.
80. See supra note 77.
81. For a discussion of the various kinds of comparative fault see UNIF. COM-
PARATIVE FAULT AcT §§ 1-10, 12 U.L.A. 40-50 (1985 Supp.) (Comm'r Prefatory
Note 39-40); W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 67 471-74 (5th ed.
1984).
82. See infra notes 148-206 and accompanying text.
83. Alaska (no opinion); California (admissible), Truman v. Vargas, 275 Cal.
App. 2d 976, 80 Cal. Rptr. 373 (1969), and Franklin v. Gibson, 138 Cal. App. 3d 340,
188 Cal. Rptr. 23 (1982); Florida, (admissible) Insurance Co. of North America v.
Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 1984); Illinois (inadmissible), Clarkson v. Wright,
108 II1. 2d 129, 90 Ill. Dec. 950, 483 N.E.2d 268 (1985); Iowa (inadmissible), IowA
CODE ANN. § 321.445 (West 1966) (this statute was adopted before comparative fault
was adopted in Goetzman v. Wichern, 327 N.W.2d 742 (Iowa 1982)); Louisiana (ap-
pears to favor admission), 56 NOTRE DAME LAW. 272, 274 n.10c (1980); Michigan
(inadmissible), Romankewiz v. Black, 16 Mich. App. 119, 167 N.W.2d 606 (1969)(this case was decided before Michigan adopted comparative fault in Placek v. Sterling
Heights, 405 Mich. 638, 275 N.W.2d 511 (1979), and the seat belt defense has not
been addressed by the appellate or supreme court since that time); Mississippi (incon-
sistent rulings), compare Glover v. Daniels, 310 F. Supp. 750 (N.D. Miss. 1970) with
D.W. Boutwell Butane Co. v. Smith, 244 So. 2d 11 (Miss. 1971); Missouri (inadmissi-
ble) Miller v. Haynes, 454 S.W.2d 293 (Mo. App., E.D. 1970) (Miller v. Haynes was
decided before comparative fault was decided in Gustafson v. Benda, 661 S.W.2d 11
(Mo. 1983) (en banc), and the issue has not been raised since); New Mexico (inadmis-
sible), Selgado v. Commercial Warehouse Co., 88 N.M. 579, 544 P.2d 716 (1975)
(Selgado was decided before the adoption of comparative fault in New Mexico, Scott
v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682, 634 P.2d 1234 (1981)); New York (admissible), Spier v.
Barker, 35 N.Y.2d 444, 363 N.Y.S.2d 916, 323 N.E.2d 164 (1974); Rhode Island (no
opinion); Washington (inadmissible), Amend v. Bell, 89 Wash. 2d 124, 570 P.2d 138
(1977) (en banc) (this case was decided before Washington's 1981 amendment to their
comparative fault statute which now includes the U.C.F.A. definition of fault which
includes unreasonable failure to avoid an injury WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.22.005
(Supp. 1985)).
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under comparative fault will concern what actions or inactions constitute fault.
This concern should be lessened in jurisdictions that have adopted the Uniform
Comparative Fault Act as it provides a definition of fault.8 ' "There will also
be disagreement as to the inclusion of unreasonable failure 5 to avoid an injury
or to mitigate damages in the definition of fault. This will probably include the
seat belt cases ... ,,5
Some modified comparative fault jurisdictions have also allowed the seat
belt defense,87 while several other comparative negligence jurisdictions have
refused to allow the seat belt defense for various reasons.88
The most common reason given by courts for not allowing the defense is
84. See UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT §§ l(a), (b), 12 U.L.A. 40-46 (Supp.
1985):
Section 1. [Effect of Contributory Fault]
(a) In an action based on fault seeking to recover damages for injury or
death to person or harm to property, any contributory fault chargeable to the
claimant diminishes proportionately the amount awarded as compensatory
damages for an injury attributable to the claimant's contributory fault, but
does not bar recovery. This rule applies whether or not under prior law the
claimant's contributory fault constituted a defense or was disregarded under
applicable legal doctrines, such as last clear chance.(b) "Fault" includes acts or omissions that are in any measure negligent
or reckless toward the person or property of the actor or others, or that sub-
ject a person to strict tort liability. The term also includes breach of warranty,
unreasonable assumption of risk not constituting an enforceable express con-
sent, misuse of a product for which the defendant otherwise would be liable,
and unreasonable failure to avoid an injury or to mitigate damages. Legal
requirements of causal relation apply both to fault as the .basis for liability
and to contributory fault.
See also comment to subsection (b): at 41
"Injury attributable to the claimant's contributory fault" refers to the
requirement of a causal relation for the particular damage. Thus, negligent
failure to fasten a seat belt would diminish recovery only for damages in
which the lack of a seat-belt restraint played a part, and not, for example, to
the damage to the car. A similar rule applies to a defendant's fault.
85. Whether the failure to wear a seat belt constitutes unreasonable failure to
avoid an injury will be discussed in detail later. See infra notes 190-206 and accompa-
nying text.
86. H. WOODS, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE 416 (1978).
87. E.g., Harlan v. Curbo, 250 Ark. 610, 466 S.W.2d 459 (1971); Bentzler v.
Braun, 34 Wis. 2d 362, 149 N.W.2d 626 (1967). See generally, Annot., 95 A.L.R.3d
239 (1979).
88. Comment, supra note 68, at 380. As noted in this comment at 378, the
Colorado Supreme Court, while rejecting the seat belt defense under contributory neg-
ligence in Fischer v. Moore, 183 Colo. 382, 517 P.2d 458 (1973), left open the possibil-
ity of allowing the seat belt defense under comparative negligence. Fischer, 183 Colo.
at 394, 517 P.2d at 459. In Churning v. Staples, 628 P.2d 180, 181 (Colo. Ct. App.
1981), however, the Colorado Court of Appeals stated "we find the logic in Fischer still
compelling and hold that the seat belt defense is not available for purposes of determin-
ing the degree of the plaintiffs negligence under the comparative negligence statute."
Colorado is a modified comparative negligence jurisdiction.
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the absence of a duty to wear a seat belt.8 9 The courts reason where there is no
duty there can be no negligence. 90 Other reasons given for not allowing the
defense are lack of causation, 91 fear of speculation as to what portion of the
injuries would have been prevented had a seat belt been worn, 92 that such a
change in the law is properly left to the legislature,93 that the effectiveness of
seat belts is uncertain, 94 and that allowing the seat belt defense would lead to
a battle of the experts. 5 One final concern enunciated by the comparative
fault jurisdictions is the potential inequity in comparing the defendant's fault
which causes the accident with the plaintiff's fault in failing to fasten a seat
belt.98 This concern should be alleviated in jurisdictions which follow the Uni-
form Comparative Fault Act because under that act, "the trier of fact shall
consider both the nature of the conduct of each party at fault and the extent
of the causal relation between the conduct and the damage claimed.19 7
Several courts rejecting the seat belt defense have listed among their rea-
sons for so doing the uncertainty concerning the effectiveness of the seat belt
as a safety precaution.9 8 While at one time it was not incorrect to deem seat
belt effectiveness "at best speculative," 99 such a characterization is no longer
supportable. 10 0
89. See, e.g., Petersen v. Klos, 426 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970), amended on other
grounds, 433 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1970) (also note, no evidence to support a causal
connection between the plaintiff's alleged negligent nonuse of an available seat belt and
the decedent's injuries); Taplin v. Clark, 6 Kan. App. 2d 66, _ 626 P.2d 1198,
1201 (1981) (Kansas is a modified comparative fault state); D.W. Boutwell Butane Co.
v. Smith, 244 So. 2d II (Miss. 1971) (also note that in this case there was insufficient
evidence that the plaintiff's injuries would not have occurred, or that they would have
been less serious had the plaintiff worn a seat belt); Amend v. Bell, 89 Wash. 2d 124,
132-33, 570 P.2d 138, 143 (1977) (en bane).
90. See, e.g., Amend v. Bell, 89 Wash. 2d 124, 570 P.2d 138 (1977) (en bane).
91. Melesko v. Riley, 32 Conn. Supp. 89, 339 A.2d 479 (1975) (comparative
negligence did not change the principles of causation; the court held that to be negli-
gent or at fault one must contribute to the accident, not merely increase the extent of
his injuries; Connecticut is a modified comparative fault state).
92. Amend, 89 Wash. 2d at 133, 570 P.2d at 143.
93. See supra note 68, and accompanying text.
94. Petersen v. Klos, 426 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970), amended on other grounds,
433 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1970); D.W Boutwell Butane Co. v. Smith, 244 So. 2d 11
(Miss. 1971).
95. Amend, 89 Wash. 2d at 133, 570 P.2d at 143.
96. Note, supra note 5, at 168; Smith, The Failure to Buckle Up: Limiting
Damages by Proof of a Plaintiffs Nonuse of an Available Seat Belt, 53 N.Y. ST. B.J.
418, 421 (Oct. 1981).
97. UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT AcT § 2(b), 12 U.L.A. at 43 (Supp. 1985).
Also, as a practical matter, juries no doubt realize the differences in the nature and
amount of fault and award damages accordingly. But see, Smith, supra note 96, at 421
(examples of jury substantially reducing injured plaintiff's damage award).
98. See authorities cited supra note 7.
99. Kleist, The Seat Belt Defense-An Exercise in Sophistry, 18 HASTINGS L.J.
613, 615 (1967).
100. Bowman, supra note 66, at 191-92; Hoglund & Parsons, supra note 68, at
[Vol. 50
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Properly worn seat belts may be the most significant source of automobile
crash protection for automobile occupants.' 0 ' Seat belts prevent ejection 0 2
from automobiles 0 3 as well as prevent "second collisions" of the automobile
occupant with the interior of the automobile or with other occupants. 104 The
use of seat belts by all automobile occupants could save an estimated 15,000 to
18,000 lives per year and prevent more than 200,000 moderate to severe inju-
ries. 20 5 Seat belts are less effective in preventing injury when there is a crush-
ing or collapse of the occupant compartment. 0 6 Seat belts have also been
credited with preventing accidents altogether.0 " Seat belt usage remains low
14-15; Huelke, Practical Defense Problems-The Expert's View, 53 MARQ. L. REV.
203 (1970); Snyder, The Seat Belt as the Cause of Injury, 53 MARQ. L. REV. 211, 222
(1970); Comment, supra note 68, at 375; Note, supra note 5, at 170.
101. Bowman, supra note 66, at 191.
102. Ejection from a vehicle increases the chance of fatality almost 500%. See
Bowman, supra note 66, at 196.
103. DOT, Effectiveness and Efficiency of Safety Belt Usage, at 6; Bowman,
supra note 66, at 196; Snyder, supra note 100, at 222; Note, supra note 5, at 170;
Huelke, supra note 100, at 205; Note, supra note 5, at 170.
104. See authorities cited supra, note 103. For an illustrated description of what
occurs during the first and second collisions see DOT, Effectiveness and Efficiency of
Seat Belt Usage at 4.
105. United States Dep't of Transp., Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin.,
Nat'l Safety Belt Usage Program: Progress and Assessment Report, 2 (1983) [herein-
after cited as DOT, Progress and Assessment Report]. Evidence regarding the effec-
tiveness of seat belts in reducing deaths and injury severity comes from comparison of
the injury and death rates of crashes involving seat belt wearers with those of non-
wearers and changes in the level of occupant injuries and deaths in nations with
mandatory seat belt laws. See also United States Dep't of Transp., Nat'l Highway
Traffic Safety Admin., Effectiveness of Safety Belt Usage Laws (1980).
Accidents of all types are the third leading cause of death. When losses are mea-
sured in terms of numbers of working years cost, accidents rank first with an average
cost of more than 20 years. Automobile accidents account for 50% of all accidental
deaths. Transportation Research Board Nat'l Academy of Sciences, Study of Methods
for Increasing Safety Belt Use 2 (1981). Economic loss to society from motor vehicle
crashes is estimated at $57 billion every year. DOT, Progress and Assessment Report
at ii.
In 1971 it was estimated that indirect losses such as medical expenses and lost
wages due to nonuse of seat belts was approximately $1 billion per year. Comment,
supra note 64, at 427.
The figure of $1 billion per year has no doubt increased significantly in the past 14
years. Losses from seat belt nonuse also include pain and suffering to the victim, indi-
rect losses to employers, consumers and investors, and a potential drain on societal
resources. Comment, supra note 64, at 428. The public in general may also suffer as a
result of seat belt nonuse, bearing higher health care and insurance costs and higher
tax costs because of the additional burdens on the social welfare system. Transportation
Research Board Nat'l Academy of Sciences, Study of Methods for Increasing Safety
Belt Use 6 (1981).
106. Huelke, supra note 100, at 209.
107. E.g., DOT, Effectiveness and Efficiency of Safety Belt Usage at 6; 50
WASH. L. REV. 1, 4 n.1l (1974); Bowman, supra note 66, at 196.
1985]
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despite the evidence supporting its effectiveness in preventing injuries.108
Most courts have not been willing to take judicial notice of the efficacy of
seat belts.10 9 Some courts have interpreted the low seat belt usage rate as an
indication of the public's ignorance as to the effectiveness of seat belts.110 Un-
willing to charge the public with such knowledge, the courts decline to find
negligence on the part of the nonuser."' The view that the public is unaware
of the effectiveness of seat belts in preventing fatal and serious injuries can no
longer be supported." 2 The fact that usage rate fluctuates and increases in
situations perceived as hazardous is evidence of the public's knowledge of seat
belt effectiveness." 3
Several arguments are often voiced in opposition of seat belt usage. These
include the belief that the seat belt can cause injuries"' and the fears of en-
trapment, burning, and submersion." 5 While there are some injuries attributa-
ble to the belt itself,"L6 "it is almost invariably of a lesser degree than had the
occupant not worn a seat belt. The significance of a comparatively minor belt
108. Dep't of Transporation estimates seat belt usage at 14% for the first half of
1983 up from 11% in 1981. DOT, Progress and Assessment Report at ii.
109. Bowman, supra note 66, at 198; see also supra note 7, and accompanying
text; see, e.g., Britton v. Doehring, 286 Ala. 498, 242 So. 2d 666 (1970); Lipscomb v.
Diamiani 226 A.2d 914 (Del. 1967); Lafferty v. Allstate Ins. Co., 425 So. 2d 1147
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982), rev'd, 451 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 1984); D.W. Boutwell Butane
Co. v. Smith, 244 So. 2d 11 (Miss. 1971); Barry v. Coca-Cola Co., 99 N.J. Super. 270,
239 A.2d 273 (1967). But see Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d at 447; Spier v. Barker, 35
N.Y.2d 444, 323 N.E.2d 164, 363 N.Y.S.2d 916 (1974); Derheim v. Fiorito Co., 80
Wash. 2d 161, 492 P.2d 1030 (1972); Bentzler v. Brown, 34 Wis. 2d 362, 149 N.W.2d
626 (1967).
110. E.g., Petersen v. Klos, 426 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970), amended on other
grounds, 433 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1970); Miller v. Miller, 273 N.C. 228, 160 S.E.2d 65
(1968). See generally, Note, supra note 3, at 286; Comment, supra note 3.
111. Miller v. Miller, 273 N.C. 228, 232, 160 S.E.2d 65, 69 (1968) ("The social
utility of wearing a seat belt must be established in the mind of the public before
failure to use a seat belt can be held to be negligence.").
112. In June, 1983 the average percentage of people who had seen or heard an
advertisement concerning safety belts was 69.6%. DOT Progress and Assessment Re-
port at ii. In another survey, only 10.3% of persons questioned said that they never used
seat belts. Kircher, supra note 1, at 181. See also Comment, supra note 3, at 843.
113. United States Dep't of Transp., Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin.,
Safety Belt Usage Attitude Study 3-9 (1979).
114. E.g., Romankewiz v. Black, 16 Mich. App. 119, 124, 167 N.W.2d 606, 609
(1969); Kleist, supra note 99, at 614; 1983 DEr. C.L. REV. 827, 832 n.25 (1983); 56
NOTRE DAME LAW. 272, 286 n.76 (1980).
115. E.g., Hampton v. State Highway Comm'n, 209 Kan. 565, 498 P.2d 236
(1972); Miller v. Miller, 273 N.C. 228, 233, 160 S.E.2d 65, 69 (1968); Kircher, supra
note 1, at 182; 56 NOTRE DAME LAW. 272, 286 n.76 (1980); 50 WASH. L. REV. 1, 4
n.12 (1974). But see United States Dep't of Transp., Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety
Admin., Safety Belt Usage Attitude Study 3.4 (1979) (a 1979 survey showed only 6%
of the population harbor this fear).
116. See generally Snyder, supra note 100, at 224; Seat Belts-Pros and Cons,
29 CURRENT MED. FOR ATrY's 31 (Nov. 1982).
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injury must be viewed in proper perspective to the more serious or fatal inju-
ries shown to occur to unrestrained occupants."" 7 The fears of entrapment,
submersion, and burning are unfounded."" 8 It has also been noted that even if
fire or submersion do occur, the seat belt wearer will be better able to cope
with the situation because he is less likely to lose consciousness.119 While indi-
viduals cite discomfort, sporadic driving, and forgetfulness as the main reasons
for not wearing seat belts, 20 most people have never made a conscious decision
not to wear seat belts."' The fact remains, however, as stated by the Wiscon-
sin Supreme Court, "as a matter of common knowledge, an occupant of an
automobile either knows or should know of the additional safety factor pro-
duced by the use of seat belts.'
2 2
There are three available theories under which the seat belt evidence may
be admissible. 23 Every court which has addressed the issue has rejected the
negligence per se theory."24 The most common reason for rejecting this theory
is that seat belt usage is not statutorily required."2 Courts have been unwilling
117. Snyder, supra note 100, at 224.
118. Kircher, supra note 1, at 183; see also 50 WASH. L. REV. 1, 6-7 n.16 (1974)
(fire occurs in only 0.2% of all injury producing accidents and submersion occurs in
only 0.3%).
119. 50 WASH. L. REV. 1, 6-7 n.16 (1974).
120. United States Dep't of Transp., Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin.,
Safety Belt Usage Attitude Study 3.4 (1979) [hereinafter cited as DOT, Attitude
Study].
121. DOT Progress and Assessment Report at 4.
122. Bentzler v. Braun, 34 Wis. 2d 362, 387, 149 N.W.2d 626, 640 (1967); see
also Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d at 453 ("In view of the importance of the seat belt as a
safety precaution available for the plaintiff's protection, failure to wear it under certain
circumstances may be a pertinent factor for the jury to consider in deciding whether
the plaintiff exercised due care for his or her own safety.").
123. See supra note 38.
124. Miller v. Miller, 273 N.C. 228, 233-34, 160 S.E.2d 65, 70 (1968); Hoglund
& Parsons, supra note 68, at 9; Kircher, supra note 1, at 174; Note, supra note 3, at
272; Note, Negligence-Seat Belts-Mitigation of Damages-Nonuse of an Available
Seat Belt May Be Considered in Determining whether Plaintiff Exercised Due Care in
Mitigating His Injuries in a Motor Vehicle Accident, 3 HOFSTRA L. REV. 883, 887
(1975); Note, supra note 5, at 162. Typical cases are Remington v. Arndt, 28 Conn.
Super. 289, 259 A.2d 145 (1969); Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 1984); Kavanagh
v. Butorac, 140 Ind. App. 139, 221 N.E.2d 824 (1966); Romankewiz v. Black, 16
Mich. App. 119, 167 N.W.2d 606 (1969); Spier v. Barker, 35 N.Y.2d 444, 450, 363
N.Y.S.2d 916, 323 N.E.2d 164, 167, 920-21 (1974); Miller v. Miller, 273 N.C. 228,
233-34, 160 S.E.2d 65, 70 (1968); Bentzler v. Braun, 34 Wis. 2d 362, 385, 149
N.W.2d 626, 639 (1967). For a more comprehensive listing of cases rejecting the negli-
gence per se theory see, 3 HOFSTRA L. REV. 883, 887 n.19 (1975); 1983 DEr. C.L. REV.
827, 828 n.8 (1983); 53 MARQ. L. REV. 172, 174 n.12 (1970).
125. E.g., Petersen v. Klos, 426 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970), amended on other
grounds, 433 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1970); Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d at 453; Romankewiz v.
Black, 16 Mich. App. 119, 167 N.W.2d 606 (1969); D.W. Boutwell Butane Co. v.
Smith, 244 So. 2d 11 (Miss. 1971); Selgado v. Commercial Warehouse Co., 88 N.M.
579, 582, 544 P.2d 719, 722 (1975); Spier v. Barker, 35 N.Y.2d 444, 450, 363
N.Y.S.2d 916, 920-21, 323 N.E.2d 167, 167 (1974); Miller v. Miller, 273 N.C. 228,
1985]
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to view seat belt installation statutes as imposing a duty to wear seat belts,12 6
even when the statutes contained "installed for use" language.127 In the pres-
ence of a statutory requirement that seat belts be worn,1 28 the negligence per
231, 160 S.E.2d 65, 68 (1968); Bentzler v. Braun, 34 Wis. 2d 362, 385, 149 N.W.2d
626, 639 (1967). See generally Annot., 92 A.L.R.3d 9, 14 (1979).
126. Petersen, 426 F.2d at 204, amended on other grounds, 433 F.2d 911
(1970); Romankewiz, 16 Mich. App. at 124, 167 N.W.2d at 607; Selgado, 88 N.M. at
582, 544 P.2d at 722; Miller, 273 N.C. at 231, 160 S.E.2d at 68; Amend, 89 Wash. 2d
at 132, 570 P.2d at 143. See generally, Note, supra note 3, at 278; Comment, supra,
note 3, at 830-31; Kircher, supra note 1, at 180.
127. Proponents of the seat belt defense, when alleging nonuse of an available
seat belt is negligence per se, typically argue that in requiring "installation for use,"
the legislature intended to impose a duty to wear the seat belts on automobile occu-
pants. 56 NOTRE DAME LAW. 272, 278 n.25 (lists of state seat belt installation statutes,
specifying which of these statutes contain "for use" language). See also, Miller, 273
N.C. at 233-34, 160 S.E.2d at 68; Bentzler, 34 Wis. 2d at 385, 142 N.W.2d at 639("It seems apparent that the Wisconsin legislation, which does not require by its terms
the use of seat belts, cannot be considered a safety statute in a sense that it is negli-
gence per se for an occupant of an automobile to fail to use available seat belts.");
Kircher, supra note 1, at 175 (without a showing of greater legislative intent on the
issue, it would appear that there is no legislative standard of conduct as to seat belt
usage); 1983 DET. C.L. REV. 827, 831 n.18 (1983).
128. For a listing of statutes requiring seat belt usage see 56 NOTRE DAME LAW.
272, 278 n.24 (1980). New York (1984 N.Y. Laws ch. 365 §§ 1-5, effective date Jan.
1, 1985) and Illinois (ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 95 § 12-603.1 (Smith-Hurd 1985)) have
mandatory seat belt usage laws. Compare 1984 N.Y. Laws ch. 365 § 1(8) ("Non-
compliance with the provisions of this section shall not be admissible as evidence in any
civil action in a court of law in regard to the issue of liability but may be introduced
into evidence in mitigation of damages provided the party introducing said evidence has
pleaded such non-compliance as an affirmative defense.") with ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 95
§ 12-603.1(c) ("failure to wear a seat safety belt in violation of this Section shall not
be considered evidence of negligence, shall not limit the liability of an insurer, and shall
not diminish any recovery for damages arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or
operation of a motor vehicle"). But see Mo. S.B. 43, 83d Gen. Assembly, 1st Sess.
(1985):
3. In any action to recover damages arising out of the ownership, common
maintenance or operation of a motor vehicle, failure to wear a safety belt in
violation of this section shall not be considered evidence of comparative negli-
gence. Failure to wear a safety belt in violation of this section may be admit-
ted to mitigate damages, but only under the following circumstances:
(1) Parties seeking to introduce evidence of the failure to wear a safety
belt in violation of this section must first introduce expert evidence proving
that a failure to wear a safety belt contributed to the injuries claimed by
plaintiff;
(2) If the evidence supports such a finding, the trier of fact may find that
the plaintiff's failure to wear a safety belt in violation of this section contrib-
uted to the plaintiff's claimed injuries, and may reduce the amount of plain-
tiff's recovery by an amount not to exceed one percent of the damages
awarded after any reductions for comparative negligence.
Missouri, while statutorily permitting the seat belt defense, in effect disallows it. The
1% limitation on plaintiffs damage reduction makes the cost of the seat belt defense
prohibitive. If the plaintiff can plead and prove $100,000 in damages, the defendant
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se approach would have merit 29 absent statutory preclusion of that
approach.1
30
The theory that nonuse of an available seat belt is contributory negligence
was also rejected by the Pasakarnis court . 3' The court followed the majority
view"1 2 on this theory stating that to constitute contributory negligence, the
plaintiff must contribute to the cause of the accident, not merely cause or
increase the injuries. 3 The failure to wear a seat belt does not cause the
accident.3
4
A few courts have addressed the contributory negligence theory in terms
of injury or harm causation."35 Under this approach consideration of seat belt
nonuse is limited to the issue of damages as opposed to the issue of liability."36
could use the seat belt defense to reduce the damages by a maximum of $1,000. In
most cases the cost of expert testimony required to present this defense far exceed the
damage reduction allowed.
129. Note, supra note 3, at 277-78; Kircher, supra note 1, at 175, 180.
130. See supra note 128.
131. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d at 453-54.
132. See generally Annot., 92 A.L.R.3d 9 (1979). The vast majority of courts
reject the theory that failure to use an available seat belt is contributory negligence.
See 56 NOTRE DAME LAW. 272, 272 n.3 (1980), and add to that list Pritts v. Walter
Lowery Trucking Co., 400 F. Supp. 867 (W.D. Pa. 1975); Fischer v. Moore, 183 Colo.
392, 517 P.2d 458 (1973); Melesko v. Riley, 32 Conn. Supp. 89, 339 A.2d 479 (1975);
Remington v. Arndt, 28 Conn. Supp. 289, 259 A.2d 145 (1969); McCord v. Green, 362
A.2d 720 (D.C. Ct. App. 1976); Mount v. McClellan, 91 111. App. 2d 1, 234 N.E.2d
329 (1968); Hampton v. State Highway Comm'n, 209 Kan. 565, 498 P.2d 236 (1972);
Placek v. Sterling Heights, 52 Mich. App. 619, 217 N.W.2d 900 (1974); Romankewiz
v. Black, 16 Mich. App. 119, 167 N.W.2d 606 (1969); Miller v. Haynes, 454 S.W.2d
293 (Mo. App., E.D. 1970); Spier v. Barker, 35 N.Y.2d 444 363 N.Y.S.2d 916, 323
N.E.2d 167 (1974); Miller v. Miller, 273 N.C. 228, 160 S.E.2d 65 (1968); Fields v.
Volkswagen of America, 555 P.2d 48 (Okla. 1976); Amend v. Bell, 89 Wash. 2d 124,
570 P.2d 138 (1977); Derheim v. Fiorito, 80 Wash. 2d 161, 492 P.2d 1030 (1972).
133. Hoglund & Parsons, supra note 68, at 11; Note, supra note 124, at 891.
For cases following this line of reasoning see Melesko v. Riley, 32 Conn. Supp. 89, 339
A.2d 479 (1975); Remington v. Arndt, 28 Conn. Supp. 289, 259 A.2d 145 (1969);
McCord v. Green, 362 A.2d 720 (D.C. Ct. App. 1976); Placek v. Sterling Heights, 52
Mich. App. 619, 217 N.W.2d 900 (1974); Romankewiz v. Black, 16 Mich. App. 119,
167 N.W.2d 606 (1969); Barry v. Coca-Cola, 99 N.J. Super. 270, 239 A.2d 273
(1967); Spier v. Barker, 35 N.Y.2d 444, 323 N.E.2d 167, 363 N.Y.S.2d 916 (1974);
Derheim v. Fiorito, 80 Wash. 2d 161, 492 P.2d 1030 (1972). See generally Kircher,
supra note 1, at 177; Sullivan, supra note 49, at 177; Lester, Seat Belts and the De-
fense of Contributory Negligence, 57 LAW INST. J. 1058 (1983).
134. Miller v. Miller, 273 N.C. 228, 231, 160 S.E.2d 65, 68 (1968); see also,
Brown v. Kendrick, 192 So. 2d 49 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966); Romankewiz v. Black,
16 Mich. App. 119, 126, 167 N.W.2d 606, 610 (1969); Kircher, supra note 1, at 176;
Note, supra note 3, at 284; 50 U. COLO. L. REv. 375, 381 n.31 (1979).
135. E.g., Glover v. Daniels, 310 F. Supp. 750, 760 (N.D. Miss. 1970); Bentzler
v. Brown, 34 Wis. 2d 362, 149 N.W.2d 626, 640 (1967). See generally Lester, Seat
Belts and the Defense of Contributory Negligence, 57 LAW INST. J. 1058, 1062 (1983);
Note, supra note 124, at 891, Note, supra note 3, at 282.
136. E.g., Truman v. Vargas, 275 Cal. App. 2d 976, 983-84, 80 Cal. Rptr. 373,
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Even though the Restatement (Second) of Torts137 and Dean Prosser' 8 refer
to the causation issue in contributory negligence as causation of injury or
harm, the position taken by the Pasakarnis court is the most common one.
Another frequently mentioned reason for rejecting the seat belt defense
under the contributory negligence theory is the absence of a duty to wear a
seat belt. 139 While the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Bentzler v. Brown""' held
that there was a duty to wear available seat belts based on the common law
standard of ordinary care,""' a common law duty to wear seat belts has not
been favored. 4 1 In view of the variety of circumstances which arise in automo-
bile travel, the rejection of this argument seems reasonable.143 Other reasons
given for rejecting the contributory negligence theory include the harshness of
the result,144 that the legislature is the proper forum for such a decision,' 45 and
375 (1969); Bentzler v. Braun, 34 Wis. 2d 362, 149 N.W.2d 626 (1967).
137. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 465 (1965) provides:
Causal Relation Between Harm and Plaintiff's Negligence
(1) The plaintiff's negligence is a legally contributing cause of his harm
if, but only if, it is a substantial factor in bringing about his harm and there is
no rule restricting his responsibility for it.
(2) The rules which determine the causal relation between the plaintiff's
negligent conduct and the harm resulting to him are the same as those deter-
mining the causal relation between the defendant's negligent conduct and re-
sulting harm to others.
Comment C
Such apportionment may also be made where the antecedent negligence
of the plaintiff is found not to contribute in any way to the original accident
or injury, but to be a substantial contributing factor in increasing the harm
which ensues. There must of course be satisfactory evidence to support such a
finding, and the court may properly refuse to permit the apportionment on the
basis of mere speculation.
138. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 65 at 451 (5th ed. 1984)
("Contributory Negligence is conduct on the part of the plaintiff, contributing as a
legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is
to conform for his own protection.").
139. See, e.g., Romankewiz, 16 Mich. App. at 121, 167 N.W.2d at 607 ("com-
mon-law duty to use ordinary care for his own safety does not include a duty to wear
seat belts"); Fields v. Volkswagen of America, 555 P.2d 48, 62 (Okla. 1976) ("in the
absence of any common law or statutory duty, we find that evidence of the failure to
use seat belts is not admissible to establish a defense of contributory negligence");
Amend, 89 Wash. 2d at 132, 570 P.2d at 143 ("The question then is whether the court
should impose a standard of conduct upon all persons riding in vehicles equipped with
seat belts. We think we should not.").
140. Bentzler v. Braun, 34 Wis. 2d 362, 149 N.W.2d 626 (1967).
141. Id. at 639 (also note: Wisconsin is a comparative fault state and a breach of
this common law duty would not bar the plaintiff's recovery).
142. Note, supra note 3, at 281.
143. Kircher, supra note 1, at 175 (quoting W. PROSSER, TORTS § 37 at 212 (3d
ed. 1964) ("A standard which requires only conduct proportionate to the circumstances
and the risk seldom, if ever, can be made a matter of absolute rule.")).
144. See, e.g., Fischer v. Moore, 183 Colo. 392, 517 P.2d 458 (1973) (en banc);
Miller, 273 N.C. at 237, 160 S.E.2d at 73; Derheim, 80 Wash. 2d at 168, 492 P.2d at
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fear of a fortuitous windfall to the tortfeasor. 14 6 While courts have been reluc-
tant to allow seat belt evidence under a contributory negligence theory, the
option of pleading contributory negligence for the purpose of reducing dam-
ages may still be available.
147
The third main theory 48 is apportionment or mitigation of damages.1 49
Under this theory, evidence of the plaintiff's failure to wear an available seat
belt is directed toward the issue of damages rather than liability. 50 Propo-
nents of this theory argue that since the defendant is only responsible for those
damages which he proximately caused, he should not be held responsible for
those injuries that would not have occurred but for the plaintiff's nonuse of a
seat belt.15' The mitigation theory 52 is a balance between the harshness of
totally barring recovery and, conversely, allowing the occupant of an automo-
bile to disregard a proven safety device which may significantly reduce his
chances of serious injury or death.253
"An obvious prerequisite to the reduction of damages due to nonuse of
seat belts is the imposition of a duty to wear such equipment.' 54 While the
imposition of an absolute duty to wear seat belts has not been favored,15 5 there
are two duty analyses under which seat belt evidence has been admitted to
assist the jury in determining whether the plaintiff acted reasonably under the
circumstances. The first of these is the rule of avoidable consequences. Under
1035.
145. See supra note 68, and accompanying text.
146. See, e.g., Fischer, 183 Colo. at 395-96, 517 P.2d at 460.
147. Note, supra note 3, at 275; Comment, supra note 64 at 439 ("since failure
to use a seat belt may increase damages, but cannot cause accidents, a rule apportion-
ing losses would not be inconsistent with the traditional doctrine of contributory
negligence").
148. Other theories have also been advanced by the proponents of the seat belt
defense. These include (1) assumption of the risk, Kleist, supra note 99, at 620; 3
HOFSTRA L. REV. 883, 886 n.15 (1975); 1983 DET. C.L. REV. 827, 845 n.106 (1983);
Comment, supra note 68, at 378; (2) contribution among joint tortfeasors, see Com-
ment, supra note 68, at 378-79; and (3) superseding v. intervening causes, Note, supra
note 3, at 289.
149. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d at 454.
150. Note, supra note 3, at 275; Note, supra note 5, at 162; 1983 DET. C.L. REV.
827, 841 n.84 (1983); see also, Clarkson v. Wright, 121 Ill. App. 3d 230, 232, 459
N.E.2d 305, 307 (1984), rev'd, 108 Ill. 2d 129, 483 N.E.2d 268 (1985); Mount v.
McClellan, 91 11. App. 2d 1, 5, 234 N.E.2d 329, 331 (1968); Spier, 35 N.Y.2d at 450,
323 N.E.2d 167, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 920 (superseded by statute as stated in Curry v.
Moser, 89 App. Div. 2d 1, 454 N.Y.S.2d 311 (1982)). See generally, Annot., 80
A.L.R.3d 1033 (1977).
151. E.g., Comment, supra note 64, at 434; Note, supra note 3, at 275.
152. For cases allowing and rejecting the seat belt defense under the mitigation
of damages theory see Note, supra note 3 at 272 nn.4-5 (1980).
153. E.g., Annot., 80 A.L.R.3d 1033, 1037-38 (1977); see also Hoglund & Par-
sons, supra note 68, at 9-10.
154. Hoglund & Parsons, supra note 68, at 11; see also, Kircher, supra note 1,
at 180; Comment, supra note 68, at 384.
155. See supra note 73, and accompanying text.
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this doctrine, recovery is denied for any damages which could have been
avoided by reasonable conduct on the part of the plaintiff.156 As a general rule,
the doctrine of avoidable consequences arises only after the plaintiff has been
injured, but while some damages may still be averted.1 7
Several courts have rejected the seat belt defense under the doctrine of
avoidable consequences, stating "the seat belt situation does not fit the doc-
trine of avoidable consequences because the failure to fasten the seat belt oc-
curred before the defendant's negligent act and before the plaintiff's in-
jury."'158 When the doctrine of avoidable consequences was developed,
opportunities to mitigate damages before injuries occurred were scarce. 159
However, the purely chronological distinction upon which this doctrine relies is
no longer justifiable and several courts have chosen to ignore it.' 60 This is the
approach taken by the Pasakarnis court.16' Citing Spier v. Barker,'62 the
court stated that seat belts afford an individual the unique opportunity to miti-
gate his damages prior to the occurrence of the accident. 63
When the post-injury doctrine of avoidable consequences is extended to
the pre-injury nonuse of seat belts, it becomes nearly analogous to the duty of
self-protection."6 4 This is the second duty analysis which may include the duty
to wear an available seat belt.6 5 The duty to protect oneself from harm re-
quires, at the very least, that one not expose oneself to a known risk. 66
One must exercise the standard of care of the reasonable prudent person
under similar circumstances in fulfilling his duty to mitigate damages or to
protect himself from harm. 67 If he acts unreasonably and such action causes
156. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 65 at 458 (5th ed.
1984).
157. Id.
158. Romankewiz, 16 Mich. App. at 127, 167 N.W.2d at 610 (quoting Miller,
273 N.C. at 239, 160 S.E.2d at 74); Lipscomb v. Diamiani, 226 A.2d 914, 917 (Del.
1967); Miller v. Haynes, 454 S.W.2d 293, 300 (Mo. App., St. L. 1970); see also,
Selgado, 88 N.M. at 581, 544 P.2d at 721; Derheim, 80 Wash. 2d at 168, 492 P.2d at
1035; Hoglund & Parsons, supra note 68, at 9-10; Kleist, supra note 99, at 620-21;
Note, supra note 3, at 285.
159. Comment, supra note 64, at 438; see, e.g., Spier, 35 N.Y.2d at 444, 323
N.E.2d at 168, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 921-22.
160. Comment, supra note 64, at 438.
161. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d 447; see also W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra
note 156, § 65 at 459 ("[T]he plaintiff's recovery should be reduced to the extent that
they [damages] have been aggravated by his own antecedent negligence. This may be
the better view unless we are to place artificial emphasis upon the moment of impact,
and the pure mechanics of causation.").
162. Spier, 35 N.Y.2d at 452-53, 323 N.E.2d at 168; 363 N.Y.S.2d at 922.
163. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d at 453.
164. Comment, supra note 3, at 847.
165. Note, supra note 3, at 281.
166. Comment, supra note 3, at 845.
167. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS, § 65 at 419 (4th ed. 1971); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 (1965); Note, supra note 3, at 281.
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harm, he is responsible for the damage he has caused.' 68 The reasonably pru-
dent man standard is perhaps the best approach to the seat belt defense.'6 9
While it has been said that the "common law duty to use ordinary care for
[one's] own safety does not include a duty to wear seat belts,' 70 it must be
remembered that that which is required of the ordinary prudent person is not
unchanging.' 7 ' The standard is adaptable and should evolve with the times.'
7 2
"It is both predictable and desirable that technological changes give rise to
new precautionary obligations.' 73 There are two primary arguments against
allowing the trier of fact to consider seat belt nonuse in determining whether
the plaintiff acted reasonably under the circumstances. The first is that in ef-
fect it would require the plaintiff to anticipate the negligence of others. 7 4 This
offends traditional notions of tort law in that there is a general right to assume
due care of others.17 5 Many courts have advanced this argument in support of
their refusal to allow the seat belt defense.176
The right to assume that others will exercise due care is not unqualified.
"[It] exists only 'in the absence of notice or knowledge to the contrary.' 1'7
There remains some question, however, as to whether the plaintiff must be on
notice of a specific act of negligence before this duty arises.17 8 The public is
generally aware that automobile accidents happen. 79 Such general awareness
should be enough to put the public on notice. 180
168. W. PROSSER, supra note 167, § 30 at 143.
169. Hoglund & Parsons, supra note 68, at 13.
170. Romankewiz, 16 Mich. App. at 121, 167 N.W.2d at 607; see also Derheim,
80 Wash. 2d at 172, 492 P.2d at 1037 (Neill, J., concurring) ("[A] failure by plaintiff
to wear a seat belt would not, in the present state of things, amount to a breach of his
duty to exercise reasonable care in his own behalf."); Hampton, 209 Kan. at 580, 498
P.2d at 249 (failure to wear a seat belt did not fall below the standard required of the
reasonable prudent man).
171. Hoglund & Parsons, supra note 68, at 13.
172. See generally W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 156, § 32 at 173-75.
173. Comment, supra note 64, at 426.
174. Kleist, supra note 99, at 615.
175. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 156, § 33 at 197-98.
176. See, e.g., Britton, 286 Ala. at 506, 242 So. 2d at 673; Nash v. Kamrath, 21
Ariz. App. 530, 532, 521 P.2d 161, 163; Remington, 28 Conn. Supp. at 292, 259 A.2d
at 146; Taplin, 6 Kan. App. 2d at __ , 626 P.2d .at 1200; Romankewiz, 16 Mich.
App. at 125, 167 N.W.2d at 610; Miller v. Haynes, 454 S.W.2d at 300; Miller, 273
N.C. at 234, 160 S.E.2d at 70; Amend, 89 Wash. 2d at 132-33, 570 P.2d at 143.
177. Comment, supra note 64, at 438-39 (quoting Roberts v. Bohn, 26 Ohio
App. 2d 50, 269 N.E.2d 53 (1971), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Suchy v. Moore,
29 Ohio St. 2d 99, 279 N.E. 2d 878 (1972).
178. Compare Kleist, supra note 99, at 615-16 with Comment, supra note 3, at
844-45.
179. Miller, 273 N.C. at 232, 160 S.E.2d at 68-69; Amend, 89 Wash. 2d at 139,
570 P.2d at 146 (Horowitz, J., dissenting); Comment, supra note 64, at 439; Comment,
supra note 3, at 844-45.
180. Comment, supra note 64, at 439; see also Comment, supra note 68, at 386
(government advertising campaigns encourage defensive driving, in effect telling motor-
ists to anticipate the negligence of others).
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The second qualification to the right to assume that others will exercise
due care concerns the danger of that assumption. A person is required to real-
ize that negligent acts do occur. Where the risk of harm is relatively slight, it
is reasonable to assume that others will act with due care. But, when the risk
becomes serious, either because the probability or the gravity of the harm are
great, reasonable care may require one to anticipate and protect against the
negligence of others. 181 In the realm of automobile travel, reasonable care
must include anticipation of negligence on the part of others.' 82
The second main argument is that because the average man doesn't wear
a seat belt, 83 seat belt nonuse cannot be deemed unreasonable.'" While cus-
tom is relevant to the issue of reasonableness,' 85 "[tihe fact that a majority of
people act in a certain manner does not make such action reasonable."' 86
While some customs are the result of logic and reasoned decision-making,
"others arise from the kind of inadvertence, carelessness, [and] indifference
. ..that is normally associated with negligence."' 81 For a custom to be rea-
sonable, it must be the product of "'learned reason.'"188 Customary negli-
gence is certainly possible, 89 and may well be the proper way to describe the
nonuse of available seat belts.
The best way to determine whether the plaintiff acted reasonably under
the circumstances is to employ the formula first articulated by Judge Learned
Hand in United States v. Carroll Towing Co.'90 Under this formula, one is
found to have acted unreasonably if the probability of harm multiplied by the
gravity of that harm is greater than the burden of adequate precautions
181. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 156, § 33 at 198. Prosser further
states, "'It is not due care to depend upon the exercise of care by another when such
reliance is accompanied by obvious danger.'"
182. Kircher, supra note 1, at 186.
183. See, e.g., Amend, 89 Wash. 2d at 133, 570 P.2d at 143.
184. Reaves, Buckle Up, 70 A.B.A. J. 35 (Feb. 1984); Comment, supra note 3, at
838 ("[tjhe courts typically interpret the high percentage of nonuse as indicative of
reasonable conduct"). Several courts have listed this argument among their reasons for
rejecting the seat belt defense. See, e.g., Taplin v. Clark, 6 Kan. App. 2d 66, - 626
P.2d 1198, 1201 (1981); Cierpisz v. Singleton, 247 Md. 215, 226, 230 A.2d 629, 635(1967); Romankewiz, 16 Mich. App. at 124-25, 167 N.W.2d at 609; Miller, 273 N.C.
at 233, 160 S.E.2d at 69; Roberts v. Bohn, 26 Ohio App. 2d 50, 56, 269 N.E.2d 53, 58(1971), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Suchy v. Moore, 29 Ohio St. 2d 99, 279
N.E.2d 878 (1972); Fields v. Volkswagen of America, 555 P.2d 48 (Okla. 1976);
Amend, 89 Wash. 2d at 133, 570 P.2d at 143; see also, Kleist, supra note 99, at 614.
The fact that the majority of Americans do not wear seat belts is not controlling on the
issue of standard of conduct. Comment, supra note 68, at 386.
185. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 156, § 33 at 194-95.
186. Note, supra note 3, at 281.
187. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 156, § 33 at 194.
188. Id. at 195.
189. Id. at 194.
190. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir.), reh'g
denied, 160 F.2d 482 (1947).
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against that harm 91 or the importance of the interest sought to be ad-
vanced.1 92 This approach was first employed in the area of the seat belt de-
fense by New York's highest court in Spier v. Barker,9 3 and is followed by
the Pasakarnis court."9
It has already been established that the general public is on notice of the
possibility of automobile accidents. 95 While the probability of being involved
in an automobile accident on any given trip is low, 96 "[t]here is a high
probability that the average motorist will be involved in at least one accident,
resulting in death or injury to himself, during his lifetime."9 7 The harm asso-
ciated with automobile accidents is great, 98 so even though the probability of
an accident occurring on any given trip is low, the risk one takes by venturing
out unprotected is great. 9
The burden of adequate precautions, on the other hand, is minimal.20 0
191. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 156, § 33 at 199; Note, supra note
124, at 888; Comment, supra note 64, at 423.
192. Kircher, supra note 1, at 184.
193. Spier v. Barker, 35 N.Y.2d 444, 452, 323 N.E.2d 164, 168, 363 N.Y.S.2d
916, 922 (1974) ("When an automobile occupant may readily protect himself, at least
partially, from the consequences of a collision, we think that the burden of buckling an
available seat belt may, under the facts of the particular case, be found by the jury to
be less than the likelihood of injury when multiplied by its accompanying severity.").
194. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d at 453 (citing Insurance Co. of North America v.
Pasakarnis, 425 So. 2d 1141, 1143 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (Schwartz, J., dissent-
ing), rev'd, 451 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 1984)).
195. See supra notes 179-80 and accompanying text; Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d at
452 (citing Ford Motor Co. v. Evancho, 327 So. 2d 201, 204 (Fla. 1976)).
196. Note, supra note 3, at 281; Kircher, supra note 1, at 185.
197. Hoglund & Parsons, supra note 68, at 3 state:
Over 1,000 Americans are killed every week in traffic accidents; almost
10,000 are injured each day. The combined figure, computed on an annual
basis, approximately equals the number of babies born in the United States
yearly ...
One's exposure to death by automobile collision is considerably higher
than one's exposure to death by involvement in warfare. From 1900 through
1972, motor vehicle deaths totaled more than 1,900,000, whereas U.S. mili-
tary casualties in principal wars (including battle and other causes of death)
from the Revolutionary War (1775) through the Viet Nam War (1972) to-
taled approximately 1,155,000.
Id. at 3-4 n.8.
198. DOT, Progress and Assessment Report at 1 states:
The fifth leading cause of all deaths is the motor vehicle accident, and
the leading cause of death for those between one year and age 44. Approxi-
mately 44,000 lives were lost last year in all highway accidents-an average
of 121 each day. An estimated 29,400 persons were killed and about 500,000
received moderate to severe injuries as occupants of passenger vehicles, light
trucks, and vans. The economic loss to society from motor vehicle crashes is
estimated at $57 billion every year.
See also, Kircher, supra note 1, at 185.
199. Kircher, supra note 1, at 185; Note, supra note 3, at 281.
200. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d at 453 (quoting Insurance Co. of North America v.
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While this burden may include such things as the costs of tactile inconve-
nience, actual physical effort, and aesthetic loss, 2 0 1 it usually cannot be said
that these burdens are greater than the risks involved in automobile travel.20 2
The public knows or should know of the effectiveness of seat belts in prevent-
ing or minimizing the injuries sustained in automobile accidents. 20 3 Under the
foregoing analysis, the plaintiff's nonuse of an available seat belt may amount
to a failure to use reasonable care.20 4 There are circumstances, however, under
which it would be reasonable to travel in an automobile without wearing a seat
belt.20 5 It was for these reasons that the Pasakarnis court stated that
"[n]onuse of the seat belt may or may not amount to a failure to use reasona-
ble care on the part of the plaintiff." 20 6
If the plaintiff is found to have acted unreasonably in not wearing his seat
belt, before his damage award can be decreased it must be shown that but for
the seat belt nonuse certain injuries would not have occurred. There must be a
causal connection between the nonuse of an available 0 7 seat belt and the inju-
ries and damages sustained. 208 The defendant has the burden of pleading and
proving the availability and nonuse of the seat belt as well as the causal con-
nection between that nonuse and the plaintiff's injuries.20 9 There is no pre-
sumption that nonuse of seat belts caused or increased the severity of
injuries.2 10
Pasakarnis, 425 So. 2d 1141, 1143 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (Schwartz, J., dissent-
ing), rev'd, 451 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 1984)); Comment, supra note 3, at 845.
201. Comment, supra note 64, at 429.
202. Cf. Spier, 35 N.Y.2d at 452, 323 N.E.2d at 168, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 922;
Comment, supra note 3, at 845; Note, supra note 3, at 281.
203. See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
204. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d at 454; Note, supra note 124, at 888; Kircher,
supra note 1, at 181; Note, supra note 3, at 281.
205. Kircher, supra note 1, at 181.
206. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d at 454; see also Spier, 35 N.Y.2d at 452, 323
N.E.2d at 168, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 922; Kircher, supra note 1, at 181; Note, supra note
124, at 888.
207. For an excellent discussion of the "available" requirement see Clarkson v.
Wright, 121 Ill. App. 3d 230, 459 N.E.2d 305 (1984) (evidence of installment is suffi-
cient to establish evidence of availability absent evidence of non-workability; failure of
a seat belt to work sometime in the past is not enough to show the seat belt didn't work
on the day of the accident), rev'd, 108 Il1. 2d 129, 90 Ill. Dec. 950, 483 N.E.2d 268
(failure to wear a seat belt should be considered for neither liability nor damages).
208. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d at 454 (citing Spier, 35 N.Y.2d at 450, 323 N.E.2d
at 167, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 920).
209. Franklin v. Gibson, 138 Cal. App. 3d 340, 342, 188 Cal. Rptr. 23, 25(1982); Truman v. Vargas, 275 Cal. App. 2d 976, 983, 80 Cal. Rptr. 373, 377-78
(1969); Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d at 454; Spier, 35 N.Y.2d at 444, 323 N.E.2d at 167,
363 N.Y.S.2d at 916; Bowman, supra note 66, at 197-98. Merely showing an available
seat belt and/or the failure to use that seat belt is not enough to establish causation.
See, e.g., Robinson v. Bone, 285 F. Supp. 423 (D. Or. 1968); Cierpisz v. Singleton, 247
Md. 215, 230 A.2d 629 (1967); Miller, 273 N.C. at 236, 160 S.E.2d at 71-72; Jones v.
Dague, 252 S.C. 261, 166 S.E.2d 99 (1969); Bowman, supra note 66, at 197-98.
210. Hoglund & Parsons, supra note 68, at 21.
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The causal connection between the nonuse of an available seat belt and
the plaintiff's injuries must be shown by "competent evidence. '21 1 Competent
evidence has been interpreted by most courts to mean expert testimony.2"2
Members of varying professions213 have qualified as experts competent to tes-
tify on the extent to which the plaintiff's injuries would have been avoided or
minimized had he worn a seat belt.2 1' Use of both biomechanic and medical
experts2 15 may be the most desirable approach to the causation issue,2"'
The need for expert witnesses provides another topic of controversy within
the seat belt defense. Opponents of the defense fear a "battle of the ex-
perts,' ' 217 as do many of the courts which have rejected the seat belt de-
fense.218 Requiring expert testimony is not uncommon in our courts and should
not stand as the reason for rejecting the seat belt defense. Adequate safe-
guards are maintained by the trial judge who has the discretion to limit expert
211. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d at 454; Spier, 35 N.Y.2d at 444, 323 N.E.2d at
167, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 916; Kircher, supra note 1, at 187.
212. E.g., Franklin, 138 Cal. App. 3d at 343, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 24; Truman v.
Vargas, 275 Cal. App. 2d 976, 982-83, 80 Cal. Rptr. 373, 376-78 (1969); Clarkson,
121 III. App. 3d at 233, 459 N.E.2d at 308; Barry v. Coca Cola Co., 99 N.J. Super.
270, 239 A.2d 273 (1967); Bentzler, 34 Wis. 2d at 388, 149 N.W.2d at 641; Hoglund
& Parsons, supra note 68, at 21-22; Note, supra note 3, at 282.
213. See Truman v. Vargas, 275 Cal. App. 2d 976, 80 Cal. Rptr. 373 (1969) (an
expert on the field of automobile accidents); Spier, 35 N.Y.2d at 447, 323 N.E.2d at
166, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 916 (professor of mechanical and aerospace engineering);
Hoglund & Parsons, supra note 68, at 21 (medical experts); Bowman, supra note 66,
(an expert biomechanic; a trajectory recontructionist). But see Turner v. Pfluger, 407
F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1969) (ear, nose, and throat specialist was not qualified to testify
whether the use of a seat belt would have decreased the severity of the injuries
suffered).
214. E.g., Franklin, 138 Cal. App. 3d 340, 188 Cal. Rptr. 23; Truman, 275 Cal.
App. 2d 976, 80 Cal. Rptr. 373.
215. A biomechanical expert would testify to the path and speed the plaintiff's
body would have taken had he worn a seat belt as well as the objects his body would
have contacted. The medical expert could then explain what, if any, injury producing
effects this contact would have had on the plaintiff.
216. For a comprehensive approach to details which should be covered by an
expert in the seat belt defense, see Bowman, supra note 66, at 191. The best cases for
the seat belt defense are those that involve total or partial ejection, violent collision
maneuvers, multiple impacts and accidents in which the seat belt would have directed
the plaintiff's path for effective utilization of intended energy absorbing portions of the
passenger compartment. The seat belt defense is much less likely to be effective when
the passenger compartment of the automobile has been severely compromised. Id. at
197. If the difference between the actual injuries and those which would have been
sustained had the plaintiff worn a seat belt is slight, the seat belt defense would not be
cost effective. Id. at 202.
217. Cf. Note, supra note 3, at 289.
218. E.g., Selfe v. Smith, 397 So. 2d 348 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Amend v.
Bell, 89 Wash. 2d 124, 570 P.2d 138 (1977); Derheim, 80 Wash. 2d 161, 492 P.2d
1030. But see Amend, 89 Wash. 2d at 135, 570 P.2d at 144 (Dolliver, J., concurring in




Missouri Law Review, Vol. 50, Iss. 4 [1985], Art. 13
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol50/iss4/13
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
testimony if it is irrelevant or cumulative. Opponents of the seat belt defense
further claim that the experts necessarily involved therein will increase the
cost and length of litigation. 19 While this is a possibility, the seat belt defense
has also been viewed as the "impetus needed to settle cases of relatively cer-
tain liability."
220
Under the apportionment or mitigation of damages theory, if the plain-
tiff's seat belt nonuse is found to be unreasonable under the circumstances,
and if that unreasonable act caused a portion of his damages, the plaintiff may
not recover for those damages that seat belt usage would have avoided.221 Evi-
dence of seat belt nonuse must be strictly limited to the issue of the plaintiff's
damages and should not be considered by the jury in their determination of
liability. 222 Fear of speculation by the jury in damage apportioning is an oft-
cited reason for rejecting the seat belt defense.223 This position fails to con-
sider the fact that damage apportioning is not new to juries.2 4 There are sev-
eral ways to ensure against jury speculation in apportioning damages. First,
requiring expert testimony to establish the causal connection between the non-
use of a seat belt and the extent of the plaintiff's injuries will necessarily tell
the jury what portion of the damages were caused by the plaintiff's alleged
negligence. 225 Second, jury speculation could be prevented by ordinary proce-
dural safeguards 226 such as detailed jury instructions and special interrogato-
ries. Finally, if there is insufficient evidence to determine with reasonable cer-
219. Derheim, 80 Wash. 2d at 169, 570 P.2d at 1035.
220. Smith, supra note 96, at 421. Also, an increase in the frequency of settle-
ment would absorb a large number of the increases in trial duration and expert witness
fees. 40 U. CH. L. REv. 421, 430 n.37 (1973).
221. Spier, 35 N.Y.2d at 450, 323 N.E.2d at 167, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 921; Kircher,
supra note 1, at 178.
222. Truman, 275 Cal. App. at 983-84, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 375; Pasakarnis, 451
So. 2d at 454; Spier, 35 N.Y.2d at 450, 323 N.E.2d at 167, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 921;
Bentzler, 34 Wis. 2d at 388, 149 N.W.2d at 641. This also applies if the apportionment
is done under the doctrine of comparative fault. See Sullivan, supra note 75, at 561;
see also UNIF. Comp. FAULT AcT § 1, 12 U.L.A. 35, 38 (Supp. 1984) (" 'Injury attrib-
utable to the claimant's contributory fault' refers to the requirement of a causal rela-
tion for the particular damage. Thus, negligent failure to fasten a seat belt would di-
minish recovery only for damages in which the lack of a seat belt restraint played a
part, and not, for example, to damage to the car.").
223. Note, supra note 3, at 287. See, e.g., Britton v. Doehring, 286 Ala. 498, 242
So. 2d 666 (1970); Fischer v. Moore, 183 Colo. 392, 517 P.2d 458 (1973); Lipscomb v.
Diamiani, 226 A.2d 914 (Del. 1967); Hampton v. State Highway Comm'n, 209 Kan.
565, 498 P.2d 236 (1972); Romankewiz, 16 Mich. App. at 127, 167 N.W.2d at 610;
Miller v. Haynes, 454 S.W.2d 293, 301 (Mo. App., E.D. 1970); Miller, 273 N.C. at
240, 160 S.E.2d at 73; Kleist, supra note 100, at 615.
224. Spier, 35 N.Y.2d at 452-53, 323 N.E.2d at 169, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 922;.
Comment, supra note 68, at 388.
225. Kircher, supra note 1, at 187; Sullivan, supra note 75, at 562; Hoglund &
Parsons, supra note 68, at 21-22. Cf. Pritts v. Walter Lowery Trucking Co., 400 F.
Supp. 867, 873-74 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
226. Comment, supra note 64, at 440.
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tainty which injuries would have been avoided had the plaintiff worn a seat
belt, the court may properly refuse to permit apportionment.22
Several different methods of apportioning damages exist.228 The following
method22 seems the most consistent with apportioning damages in a pure
comparative fault jurisdiction. Three figures are initially calculated: the acci-
dent causation percentage,230 the reduction percentage, 231 and the actual
proved damages. The gross recoverable damages are then calculated by multi-
plying the accident causation percentage by the actual proved damages 232 and
subtracting the product from the actual proved damages.2 33 At this point, the
trier of fact should decide what portion of those injuries would not have oc-
curred but for plaintiff's seat belt nonuse. The damages that would have oc-
curred regardless of seat belt usage are to be set aside and added back into the
net recoverable damages only after the portion of damages attributable to the
seat belt nonuse have been reduced.2" The gross recoverable damages which
the trier of fact has decided would not have occurred but for the seat belt
nonuse235 are then multiplied by the reduction percentage and the product is
subtracted from the gross recoverable damages.238 The final result is termed
the net recoverable damages and are the amount the plaintiff will recover un-
less the court, in its discretion, alters the reduction percentage. 237 This formula
227. Spier, 35 N.Y.2d at 453, 323 N.E.2d at 169, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 922; W.
PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 156, § 65 at 459; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 465, Comment c at 511 (1965); Kircher, supra note 1, at 187; Comment,
supra note 64, at 440.
228. See Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d at 454; Hoglund & Parsons, supra note 68, at
19; Smith, supra note 96, at 420.
229. Hoglund & Parsons, supra note 68, at 19.
230. This is the relative contribution of each party to the cause of the accident.
Hoglund & Parsons, supra note 68, at 19.
231. Reduction percentage is "the degree of personal fault that a party should
bear for the extent of, or the exacerbation of, the injuries he or she suffered due to
personal negligence." Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. Thus if the actual proved damages were $10,000, and the plaintiff was
20% at fault in causing the accidents, the gross recoverable damages would be $8,000.
234. Using the damage figure from note 233, supra, of $8,000 we will assume
$4,000 of those damages would have occurred even if the plaintiff had worn a seat belt.
The plaintiff will recover this $4,000. The remaining $4,000 of damages will be further
apportioned.
235. This added step was not included in the Pasakarnis special interrogatories.
See supra note 47.
236. We have already determined that $4,000 of the $8,000 gross recoverable
damages would not have occurred but for seat belt nonuse. The trier of fact then must
decide what percentage of fault is assignable to the plaintiff's nonuse of an available
seat belt. If the trier of fact decides that those damages are due 25% to the plaintiff's
fault and 75% to the defendant's negligence, the plaintiff will recover $3,000 + $4,000
(would have occurred even if seat belt had been worn) for a total of $7,000.
237. The reduction percentage and the net recoverable damages are inversely
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is somewhat dissimilar to the special verdict interrogatories suggested in
Pasakarnis.38 Mechanics of damage reduction aside, the question remains
whether juries (most of whom don't wear seat belts239) will actually reduce a
plaintiff's award under the seat belt defense. This will largely turn on the cir-
cumstances of each case.240
Several minor objections to the seat belt defense bear mentioning. The
first of these was raised by the dissent in Pasakarnis.24 1 Justice Shaw analo-
gizes the mandatory child restraint law242 to the seat belt defense. He stated
that since evidence of nonusage of the child restraint devices is not admissible
as evidence of negligence in civil cases, evidence of seat belt nonusage should
also be inadmissible to reduce damages.24 3 These two issues can easily be dis-
tinguished on the basis of public policy. The law does not charge a young child
with the duty of buckling himself into a restraint device, and will not reduce
his damages because of someone else's negligence.
Another argument against the seat belt defense is that it will not increase
seat belt usage.244 While no statistics are currently available on this point, it
has been suggested that allowing the seat belt defense might increase seat belt
usage.24 5 The fact that not all cars have seat belts is also listed among the
reasons for rejecting the seat belt defense. 246 Under the seat belt defense, it is
feared that the defendant will be able to "take advantage of the fortuitous
circumstance that plaintiff was riding in a car so equipped.1 247 Due to seat
belt installation requirements, 248 this objection will soon be moot. Another re-
garding of the seat belt defense is the fear of a windfall to the defendant
tortfeasor. 249 "The seat belt defense would likely result in neither substantial
238. See supra note 233. Also note that in Pasakarnis, damages were merely
apportioned. That is, the plaintiff could not recover for those damages that wouldn't
have occurred but for seat belt nonuse. His fault in not wearing a seat belt was not
compared with the defendant's fault in causing the accident. See supra note 47.
239. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
240. Smith, supra note 96, at 420 (citing damage reductions from 0-85%).
241. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d at 455 (Shaw, J., dissenting).
242. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 316.613(1), (3) (West Supp. 1984).
243. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d at 455 (Shaw, J., dissenting).
244. Miller, 273 N.C. at 238, 160 S.E.2d at 73 (citing case comment on Brown
v. Kendrick, 192 So. 2d 49 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966), in 39 COLo. L. REV. 605, 608
(1967)).
245. Transportation Research Board Nat'l Academy of Sciences, Study of Meth-
ods for Increasing Safety Belt Use, p. 6 (1981) ("A judicial doctrine permitting mitiga-
tion of damages in a civil action if the plaintiff's safety belt was not in use at the time
of a crash might help motivate drivers to use their belts."); see also 50 WASH. L. REv.
1, 15 n.52 (1974).
246. E.g., Britton, 286 Ala. at 506, 242 So. 2d at 673; Amend, 89 Wash. 2d at
133, 570 P.2d at 143; Derheim, 80 Wash. 2d at 171, 492 P.2d at 1037.
247. Amend, 89 Wash. 2d at 133, 570 P.2d at 143.
248. See supra note 108.
249. Fischer v. Moore, 183 Colo. 392, 517 P.2d 458 (1973); Comment, supra
note 68, at 377, 388; Note, supra note 3, at 285.
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lost damages to the plaintiff nor a windfall to the defendant .... ,,2,o The
final argument in opposition of the seat belt defense is that the analysis that
allows seat belt evidence to be considered by the jury will necessarily allow
evidence of any and all safety devices. 251 Under the Carroll Towing test,2 52 it
is doubtful that a plaintiff automobile occupant will be deemed unreasonable
for "failing to wear a crash helmet [or] for failing to drive an armored car. '253
The seat belt has proven to be an efficient self-protective safety device.2 4
The average motorist is aware that automobile accidents happen 5 5 and that
seat belts are effective in preventing or minimizing serious injuries.2 56 Balanc-
ing the probability of harm and the gravity of harm associated with seat bel-
tless automobile travel against the burden of wearing a seat belt, the jury
could conclude that one so traveling acted unreasonably under the circum-
stances. 257 The apportionment or mitigation of damages theory of the seat belt
defense holds the plaintiff responsible for the damages he could have reasona-
bly avoided, while compensating him for those which he could not have pre-
vented.25 18 The same result is possible under a system of pure comparative
fault, where each party is liable for that portion of the damages his negligent
conduct caused. 259 It seems infinitely more equitable to both parties to prevent
an injury than to merely award money damages to a plaintiff for a potentially
permanent, irreplaceable loss.
MICHELLE R. MANGRUM
250. Note, supra note 3, at 284.
251. Derheim, 80 Wash. 2d at 169, 492 P.2d at 1035; Kleist, supra note 99, at
621-22; Comment, supra note 64, at 426; Note, supra, note 5, at 173.
252. See supra notes 190-206, and accompanying text.
253. Kleist, supra note 99, at 621-22.
254. See supra notes 99-107, and accompanying text.
255. See supra notes 179-80, and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 108-22, and accompanying text.
257. See supra notes 190-206, and accompanying text.
258. See supra notes 148-53, and accompanying text.
259. See supra notes 76-78, and accompanying text.
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